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Abstract
International Human Rights Courts (IHRCts), such as the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), have come under increasing criticism as being incompatible with domestic judicial 
and legislative mechanisms for upholding rights. These domestic instruments are said to pos-
sess greater democratic legitimacy than international instruments do or could do. Within 
the UK this critique has led some prominent judges and politicians to propose withdrawing 
from the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Legal cosmopolitans respond by 
denying the validity of this democratic critique. By contrast this article argues that such 
criticisms are defensible from a political constitutionalist perspective but that International 
Human Rights Conventions (IHRCs) can nevertheless be understood in ways that meet 
them. To do so, IHRC must be conceived as legislated for and controlled by an international 
association of democratic states, which authorizes IHRCts and holds them accountable, lim-
iting them to ‘weak review’. The resulting model of IHRC is that of a ‘two level’ political 
constitution. The ECHR is shown to largely accord with this model, which is argued to be 
both more plausible and desirable than a legal cosmopolitan model that sidelines democracy 
and advocates ‘strong’ review.
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1  Introduction: The Democratic Legitimacy of 
International Human Rights Conventions
A prime purpose of International Human Rights Conventions (IHRCs) is to encour-
age the signatory states to comply with a certain set of human rights standards. The 
International Human Rights Courts (IHRCts) often charged with upholding these 
conventions, such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), increasingly 
claim the authority to oblige states to alter legislation in areas that have hitherto been 
regarded as exclusively domestic, such as the punishment of prisoners, membership of 
the armed forces, the nature of marriage, or the treatment of children by parents and 
schools, often overturning the judgments of domestic legislatures and constitutional 
courts in the process. Such decisions have been welcomed as enhancing both rights 
and, in a broader sense, democracy, in that they seek to advance equal concern and 
respect for the individuals and groups involved. Yet, they have also attracted growing 
criticism from a substantial number of legal and political actors, such as judges, politi-
cians, and academics, from within established democracies. These critics argue that 
IHRCts, such as the ECtHR, are not only less democratically legitimate than domestic 
legislative and judicial mechanisms for the promotion and protection of rights but also 
risk undermining these domestic instruments.1
The objections to IHRCts voiced by these critics are normative rather than strictly 
legal. After all, all well functioning democracies have signed up to at least some IHRC, 
thereby incurring the resulting legal obligations. The issue is whether they should have 
done so, or – in the case of those who claim that the circumstances that made it reason-
able to do so in the past no longer obtain – should continue to remain parties to them. 
Four related democratic concerns underlie their criticisms.2 The first criticism arises 
from the concern that these arrangements undermine domestic democracy because 
they involve citizens being subject to an authority that is not exclusively accountable 
to them. Call this the ‘exclusive democratic control’ objection. The second holds that 
these international arrangements suffer from a democratic deficit and are largely con-
trolled by unaccountable elites. As a result, there is an absence of on-going democratic 
control. This forms the ‘global democratic deficit’ objection. The third argues that the 
transfer of powers from the state to such bodies tends to lack appropriate democratic 
authorization in the first place, and that executives have abused their powers in using 
a treaty to alter the competences of domestic constitutional structures and the related 
democratic and legal processes. This comprises the ‘constitutional transfer’ objec-
tion. Finally, the fourth contends that IHRCs can add to the discretionary power of 
the judiciary. Two worries are involved here. On the one hand, it is felt that the terms 
1  E.g., Lord Hoffmann, at one time the second most senior judge in the UK, ‘The Universality of Human 
Rights’, Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture (19 Mar. 2009) and, most recently Lord Sumption, a 
Judge on the UK Supreme Court, ‘The Limits of Law’, the 27th Sultan Azlan Shah Lecture, Kuala Lumpur 
(20 Nov. 2013). For a similar view from the USA see J.A. Rabkin, Law without Nations? Why Constitutional 
Government Requires Sovereign States (2005).
2  Buchanan and Powell, ‘Survey Article: Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of International Law: Are 
they Compatible?’, 16(3) J Political Philosophy (2008) 326.
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 The Democratic Legitimacy of International Human Rights Conventions 1021
of IHRCs are so vague and abstract that both domestic judges and IHRCts can more 
or less choose when and in what ways to apply them to particular cases in poten-
tially arbitrary ways. On the other hand, domestic judges may become inappropriately 
bound by IHRCt rulings made with regard to another jurisdiction that involves quite 
different circumstances. These concerns constitute the ‘judicial discretion’ objection.
These objections are not new. Andrew Moravcsik has shown how they figured 
prominently among the established European democracies at the time of the drafting 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), making their initial support 
ambivalent at best.3 Yet, far from disappearing or diminishing in significance as the 
influence of such bodies has grown, they continue to attract considerable and ever 
more vocal support. With different emphases, the four objections have been aired both 
in countries with a tradition of ‘legal’ constitutionalism,4 such as the United States 
and Germany,5 and in those that have a ‘political’ constitutionalist tradition, such 
as the UK, many Commonwealth states, and the Nordic countries.6 Both versions of 
these criticisms serve to unsettle any easy assumption on the part of legal cosmopoli-
tans that an adherence to constitutional democracy and human rights ought to trans-
late automatically into enthusiasm for international human rights law.7
Legal constitutionalists regard the political system as being established through and 
constrained by a judicially protected legal constitution that operates as a ‘higher’ law, 
above the ordinary legislation issuing from the democratic process. In such systems, 
ordinary legislation can be disapplied by ‘strong’,8 rights-based, judicial review on the 
part of a constitutional court. By contrast, political constitutionalists contend that 
the very democratic mechanisms through which the people authorize their political 
and legal representatives and hold them to account comprise the constitution of a 
polity. They prioritize a parliamentary model of rights review and a ‘weak’ form of 
rights-based judicial review, in which a declaration of incompatibility by the appropri-
ate court is either advisory or can be overridden or put to one side by the legislature.
Legal constitutionalists may seem more surprising critics of IHRCs than political 
constitutionalists. They might be expected to be natural supporters of a cosmopolitan 
legal constitutionalist framework potentially encompassing all democratic regimes.9 
Yet, those legal constitutionalists who raise the four objections do so for reasons they 
share with political constitutionalists, albeit in a more moderate form: namely, that 
3  Moravcsik, ‘The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe’, 54 Int’l 
Org (2000) 217.
4  On the legal/political constitutionalism distinction see R. Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (2007), at 
2–7.
5  E.g., Bradley and Goldsmith, ‘UN Human Rights Standards and US Law: The Current Illegitimacy of 
International Human Rights’, 66 Fordham L Rev (1997) 319.
6  E.g., see the analysis of recent criticisms of such bodies in Nordic countries in Follesdal and Wind, ‘Nordic 
Reluctance towards Judicial Review under Siege’, 27.2, Special Issue, Nordic J Hmn Rts (2009) 131.
7  E.g., Kumm, ‘The Legitimacy of International Law: A Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis’, 15 EJIL 
(2004) 907.
8  For the strong/weak judicial review distinction see Waldron, ‘The Core Case against Judicial Review’, 115 
Yale LJ (2006) 1346, at 1354–1355.
9  For an example of this assumption on the part of a prominent legal constitutionalist see Dworkin, ‘A New 
Philosophy for International Law’, 41 Phil & Pub Aff (2013) 2.
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domestic constitutions and the courts that uphold them enjoy a higher degree of 
  democratic authorization and accountability than international arrangements cur-
rently do and possibly ever could do. According to this line of argument, national legal 
constitutions articulate the sovereign will of the people as a whole, which national 
courts are duty bound to uphold, tending to follow sustained national popular opinion 
as a result.10 Political constitutionalists simply hold a more radical version of this the-
sis, for they regard the normal processes of democratic authorization and accountabil-
ity as the means whereby a people both constitutes itself and imposes a constitutional 
check on the way it is ruled and rules itself.11 Underlying both positions is the belief 
that no objective epistemology can ground the ontological determinations by courts 
regarding even basic human rights. 12 The legitimacy of such judgments, therefore, 
must rest on their concurrence with the democratically established views of those to 
whom they are to apply, be it through their consistency with a popularly endorsed 
constitution, duly enacted legislation, or some mixture of the two.
This article deals predominantly with the political constitutionalist version of the four 
objections, referring to parallel legal constitutionalist arguments only occasionally. Political 
constitutionalism articulates the democratic concerns underlying the objections to IHRCs 
and IHRCts in their starkest form. If these instruments can be reconciled with political 
constitutionalism, they can also be rendered consistent with the legal constitutionalist ver-
sions of these same criticisms. Those making the four objections from a broadly political 
constitutionalist perspective, such as the current UK Home Secretary, Theresa May, tend to 
assume they render international instruments such as the ECHR incompatible with domes-
tic constitutional and democratic arrangements, and advocate withdrawal from them as 
a result.13 Their critics have tended to accept this assumption and consequently question 
the coherence and validity of the objections on legal cosmopolitan grounds.14 What fol-
lows challenges both these positions. I shall argue that political constitutionalism provides a 
coherent account of the four objections yet need not lead to negative conclusions regarding 
IHRCs. Rather, an account of their rationale and operation can be given that not only satis-
fies the four objections but also largely accords with the nature of the ECHR.
Beyond the parochial significance of such a demonstration within the British 
debate, this exercise yields a different understanding of the character of IHRCs from 
that associated with legal cosmopolitans. They assume IHRCs must involve a form 
of legal constitutionalism in which strong rights-based judicial review by an IHRCt 
provides a justified and necessary constraint on both popular and state sovereignty.15  
10  E.g., the account of the US constitution in B. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (1991).
11  See J. Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999), and Bellamy, supra note 4.
12  E.g., Waldron, supra note 11, at ch. 8.
13  For an overview of the objections see M. Pinto-Duschinsky, Bringing Rights Back Home: Making Human 
Rights Compatible with Parliamentary Democracy in the UK (2011) and the analysis of the debate in the 
House of Commons following the ECHR judgment in App. No. 74025/01, Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 
2), Grand Chamber Judgment 06/10/2005 on Prisoners’ Voting Rights in Nicol, ‘Legitimacy of the 
Commons Debate on Prisoner Voting’, Public L (2011) 681.
14  E.g., O’Cinneide, Human Rights and the UK Constitution (2012).
15  E.g., Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (2008), at 53 and 177; A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and 
Self-Determination (2003).
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 The Democratic Legitimacy of International Human Rights Conventions 1023
As we shall see, though, not only are some versions of legal constitutionalism incom-
patible with such a legal cosmopolitanism, but also IHRCs can be conceived in quite 
different terms as products of popular and state sovereignty that are necessarily and 
justifiably under the joint and equal control of sovereign democratic peoples as part 
of an international political constitution. Indeed, I shall argue that in the absence of 
a global demos and democratic system, which even if possible prove normatively prob-
lematic, such an international political constitution may be the only way to render 
both legal and political constitutionalism at the domestic level consistent with IHRCs 
and IHRCts.
The argument proceeds in five steps. Step one briefly outlines the political con-
stitutionalist position, and shows how it provides a constitutional rationale for the 
‘exclusive democratic control’ and ‘judicial discretion’ objections and yet is compat-
ible at the domestic level with a legislative bill of rights and weak judicial review by 
an independent judiciary operating within politically dependent courts. To meet these 
two objections, therefore, an IHRC and associated IHRCt must possess similar quali-
ties to their respective domestic counterparts and be likewise under the democratic 
control of those subject to them, either directly or via their elected representatives. To 
achieve this result, it appears necessary to respond to the ‘global democratic deficit’ 
and ‘constitutional transfer’ objections as well. Step two explores whether a popularly 
endorsed global democratic system could meet all four objections, and argues that 
while theoretically it could do so it has practical and normative shortcomings. Step 
three offers an alternative route. It starts by suggesting why political constitutional-
ists might regard IHRCs and IHRCts as necessary to preserve rather than undermine 
exclusive democratic control in an interconnected world. I then show how all four 
objections could be met via an IHRC and IHRCt that are embedded within an inter-
national association of democratic states and under their equal on-going democratic 
control. Step four shows how such a system largely accords with the ECHR. Step five 
concludes by suggesting a political constitutionalist approach to IHRCs involving 
weak review by IHRCts has few disadvantages and many advantages with regard to 
rights protection compared with a cosmopolitan legal constitutionalist position incor-
porating strong review.
2  Political Constitutionalism: Democracy, Human Rights 
and Weak Judicial Review
Political constitutionalism began as a descriptive account of the Westminster model 
of democracy and its relationship to public law,16 but has recently been generalized by 
normative legal and political theorists to offer a democratic theory of constitutional-
ism.17 I will not defend political constitutionalism here.18 Rather, the aim is to show 
16  Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’, 42 MLR (1979) 1.
17  E.g., Waldron, supra note 11; Bellamy, supra note 4.
18  I do so in ibid. For a recent survey see M. Goldoni and C. McCorkindale (eds), Special Issue on ‘Political 
Constitutions’, 14 German LJ (2013), issue no. 12.
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how – pace the criticism of legal cosmopolitans – a coherent rationale for the ‘exclu-
sive democratic control’ and ‘judicial discretion’ objections can be provided from this 
perspective. Nevertheless, that does not mean political constitutionalism is opposed to 
rights-based judicial review in any form. It proves compatible with a legislative bill of 
rights that is upheld by a democratically dependent court. The challenge, explored in 
subsequent sections, is to see if IHRCs and IHRCts respectively can possess analogous 
qualities.
A  Political Constitutionalism
Political constitutionalists contend that a democratic political system, involving regu-
lar elections for the legislature and executive between competing parties on the basis 
of one person, one vote and majority rule, offers the most legitimate and effective 
mechanism for constraining governments so they rule in the interests of the governed, 
including by ensuring they protect and promote rights. Two arguments underlie this 
claim.19 First, that rights are matters of reasonable disagreement and, secondly, that 
the most appropriate way to show citizens equal respect and concern in resolving 
these disagreements is via a democratic system that treats their different views and 
interests impartially and equitably by giving them an equal influence in any collective 
decision, including those concerning rights. I shall outline both these arguments and 
then explore their implications for the standard legal mechanisms for rights protection 
via a judicially protected bill of rights. As we shall see, the political constitutionalist 
insists that these mechanisms must lie within rather than outside the normal demo-
cratic system. The challenge with regard to IHRCs and IHRCts is whether that is pos-
sible at the international level.
According to the first argument, rights are matters of what John Rawls termed 
‘reasonable disagreement’ because, contrary to his own belief, they are subject to the 
various limitations of practical reasoning he associated with ‘the fact of pluralism’.20 
Such factors as people’s different life experiences, the vagueness of general concepts 
of rights, the diverse conceptions of them to which different theories give rise, the 
variety of normative considerations by which we might weigh rights against compet-
ing rights claims or other moral considerations, or the difficulties that often attend the 
application of our theories and conceptions of rights to concrete cases can all lead to 
reasoned and conscientious judgments about rights to diverge. Acknowledging such 
divergence need not imply either scepticism about rights or relativism. Merely, that 
even such broadly supported basic rights as those that appear in IHRCs can be subject 
to reasonable disagreement with regard to the nature of their justification, the policies 
that might best uphold them, and their relationship to other rights and values – both 
in general and in the circumstances of a particular case. After all, these same factors 
regularly lead the members of both domestic and international courts to diverge in 
their opinions over the status of a given right and the reasons and ways it may or may 
not be judged to have been infringed.
19  See Waldron, supra note 8.
20  J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (1993), at 55–56.
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 The Democratic Legitimacy of International Human Rights Conventions 1025
The second argument enters here. When courts divide in their opinions they reach 
agreement on the basis of majority rule. Political constitutionalists argue that to 
the extent that these judicial disagreements reflect differences of opinion among the 
population as a whole, their resolution should ultimately rest with legislatures that 
are elected and decide themselves on the basis of majority rule. The complexity and 
openness of modern societies render even the most conscientious and professional 
politician, official, or judge cognitively partial and fallible in their judgments, inevit-
ably favouring positions that reflect their own experience and preferences. Given this 
context of biased and possibly mistaken disagreement, democracy offers an impartial 
mechanism for citizens to protect and promote their interests in an equitable man-
ner.21 The democratic process promotes equal respect of our different views of rights by 
giving each person a vote on the issue and employing a fair procedure, majority rule, 
which is neutral between them, to decide which view should prevail. This process also 
promotes equality of concern. Voting takes place in the context of an election between 
competing parties, allowing policies to be contested and rulers to be held to account for 
their failures – including a failure to uphold rights. Within pluralist societies, majorities 
have to be constructed by building a coalition of minorities. If social divisions are cross-
cutting, then most minorities will have sufficient electoral clout to ensure that their 
views are not ignored altogether. Not being ignored, though, is different from getting 
your own way. Parties win elections by proposing a programme of government with 
wide appeal to different minorities. Such programmes bring together people’s views on 
a variety of rights, weighing them according to the relative importance they have for 
each citizen so as to settle on a collective view of the balance of rights within the com-
munity as a whole. When electoral competition occurs within one dimension, such as 
left-right, as is the case within most mature democracies, parties tend to converge on 
the median voter, which represents the Condorcet winner or those policies that achieve 
the highest ranking among the population as a whole. Electoral accountability leads 
the legislature to by and large respond to these views when debating particular policies. 
As with a legal process, the democratic process gives rights due consideration, but that 
does not mean all come away satisfied. Many will not, but they may not deserve to do 
so if they have been unable to convince sufficient fellow citizens that their views and 
preferences should prevail over those of others.
Legal constitutionalists are apt to observe that democracy is ‘not just majority rule’, 
while some rights are even ‘anti-democratic’.22 Both remarks arise from the fact that 
a democratic majority might vote to suppress a minority’s rights. However, political 
constitutionalists retort that to the extent that rights are not privileges of particular 
groups but the universal entitlements of all individuals, then majority rule actively 
promotes rights by challenging the domination of the many by the few and improv-
ing the likelihood of passing policies that reflect public rather than particular inter-
ests.23 Historically, the rule of undemocratic minorities has been far more of a danger 
21  T. Christiano, The Constitution of Equality: Democratic Authority and its Limits (2008).
22  Buchanan and Powell, supra note 2, at 330.
23  Christiano, ‘An Instrumental Argument for a Human Right to Democracy’, 39 Phil and Pub Aff (2011) 142.
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to human rights than that of democratic majorities. Meanwhile, the dangers of a 
potential ‘tyranny of the majority’ are assuaged by the aforementioned ways in which 
the electoral process provides regular opportunities for contestation and the need to 
recruit or accommodate minorities to win or exercise power.
According to the political constitutionalist, the standard features of the normal 
democratic process possess important constitutional properties.24 On the one hand, 
party competition institutionalizes a balance of power between government and 
opposition, rulers and ruled. On the other hand, it provides an incentive to public rea-
soning, whereby those who rule or aspire to do so must address the commonly avow-
able interests of the public. Support for a particular group will need to be justified in 
public terms: that tax breaks for high earners, say, help the economy as a whole and 
so benefit the general population, or that special rights for individuals in a given con-
dition or profession can be justified on the basis of principles that apply equally to all 
or serve some public good. As a result, the dangers of arbitrary rule are diminished.
Of course, precisely these claims are made by legal constitutionalists for the role 
of courts and rights-based judicial review. Yet, from the political constitutionalist’s 
perspective these legal mechanisms can be sources of arbitrary power unless they 
are themselves accountable to the public through some form of democratic process. 
Otherwise, the risk arises that the judicial determination of rights will simply reflect the 
views of those groups that have captured the judicial system and have the resources 
to exploit it. To guard against this possibility, political constitutionalists advocate plac-
ing the legal process of rights based judicial review within the democratic process of 
legislative rights review rather than the other way round, as legal constitutionalists 
generally propose. Nevertheless, as we saw, some legal constitutionalists accept a 
weaker version of this reasoning. They see the legal process as ultimately grounded 
in, and constrained by, exceptional moments of constitutional democratic politics, 
even if they regard courts as legitimately overseeing the normal democratic politics 
of legislation. By contrast, political constitutionalists regard even the democratically 
authorized power of a constitutional court to strike down legislation as offending the 
‘right of rights’ of citizens to play an equal part in the determination of their rights.25
It might be objected that democracy itself presupposes rights, and that this ‘right of 
rights’ needs a due democratic process to be judicially protected, even if substantive 
decisions regarding the content of other rights remain a matter for that process itself. 
Political constitutionalists retort that the procedural-substantive distinction proves 
impossible to maintain. Not only are process rights as controversial as substantive 
rights, but also they are often implicated in most substantive decisions. For example, 
Habermas claims that ‘a constitutional court guided by a proceduralist understanding 
of the constitution does not have to draw on its legitimation credit’; it can simply adju-
dicate on whether democratic decisions respect the ‘logic of argumentation’.26 Yet, he 
contends a ‘consistent proceduralist understanding of the constitution relies on the 
24 Bellamy,  supra note 4, at ch. 6.
25 Waldron,  supra note 11.
26  J. Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (1996), at 279.
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 The Democratic Legitimacy of International Human Rights Conventions 1027
intrinsically rational character of a democratic process that grounds the presumption 
of rational outcomes’.27 This argument makes the test of the rationality and appro-
priateness of a given democratic procedure whether it produces rational substantive 
outcomes, thereby undermining the procedural-substantive distinction. As with other 
rights, political constitutionalists contend that rights related to the democratic process 
need to be claimed and reformed within existing, normal democratic politics. After all, 
it was through such mechanisms that workers and women gained the right to vote 
in the United Kingdom, that forms of proportional representation were introduced in 
New Zealand and in the UK for regional and European elections, and so on. Those legal 
constitutionalists who regard a constitutional referendum as necessary to legitimize 
a constitution likewise recognize the possibility and justification for democracy to pull 
itself up by its own boot straps, albeit through exceptional constitutional rather than 
normal politics.
B  Independent Judges within a Democratically Dependent Judiciary: 
A Legislative Bill of Rights and Weak Review
Political constitutionalists support exclusive democratic control and are wary of judi-
cial discretion, but they do not oppose courts per se. They acknowledge that courts 
play an essential role in ensuring the law is applied impartially and equitably to indi-
vidual cases. However, they argue that to ensure that this is the case the judicial sys-
tem cannot be entirely independent from the democratic system. The judicial process 
and the judiciary themselves need to possess certain democratic qualities, and judicial 
discretion be constrained by deference to democratic legislation.
The judicial system needs to possess democratic qualities to ensure that access to 
justice is open equally to all, rather than the preserve of the wealthy or the well placed, 
and the judiciary do not form a self-selecting caste or an entrenched part of the ruling 
class, and hence are predisposed to siding with the privileged and powerful against 
the unprivileged and powerless. To be followable and identified with, the law must in 
certain crucial respects also be the ‘people’s’ law rather than merely ‘lawyer’s’ law. As 
a result, the judiciary need to be in touch with the changing social circumstances or 
mores of those whom their judgments affect if they are not to make arcane, arbitrary, 
or unreasonable demands of citizens.
Political constitutionalists argue that the legal and judicial system only comes to 
possess these qualities through being open to social and political pressures towards 
equality of access and membership. Only then are all likely to be treated as equal under 
the law. Law must operate within a democratic context, therefore, rather than being 
isolated entirely from democratic pressures, as legal constitutionalists sometimes pro-
pose. Though electing judges would impugn their independence and impartiality, as 
well as undermine the division of labour between the legislative and judicial branches, 
political constitutionalists believe the system for selecting judges should be open and 
politically criticizable should it fail to recruit in ways that are broadly representative 
of the political community, while judicial decisions must likewise not be isolated from 
27  Ibid., at 285.
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public discussion and critique. Such pressures tend to exist even in legal constitution-
alist regimes. For example, in the United States they have led Supreme Court decisions 
broadly to follow sustained, national, majority opinion.28
So far as judicial discretion is concerned, political constitutionalists contend that 
recognizing democratic processes as the source of law plays an important role in 
upholding the rule of law.29 They regard a democratic process as necessary to ensure 
laws are framed in ways that treat all equitably by judging like cases alike and unalike 
cases in ways that are relevantly different. As we saw, they maintain that this process 
encourages elected lawmakers to take into account the various views and interests of 
citizens in ways that accord them equal respect and concern. Therefore, it is import-
ant that court judgments defer to the legislature rather than engaging in constructive 
interpretations of the legislative implications of constitutional principles. Too much 
judicial discretion in the application of the law risks appearing arbitrary as to both the 
source of law, which may then seem to reflect individual whim rather than a recog-
nized public process, and its content, which may fail to give equal consideration to all 
relevant factors through being limited to those persons and arguments that have legal 
standing in the case at hand. Again, certain legal constitutionalists accept a soft form 
of this argument in regarding the constitution as a ‘higher’ law that the people have 
given themselves via a democratic process that is binding on judges as well as govern-
ments and citizens.
None of the above should be taken as suggesting that political constitutionalists do 
not think that rights are particularly important and merit special consideration or that 
courts should play no role in their protection. Rather, they believe that the specialness 
of rights can be indicated by the special way they are treated by politicians rather than 
through their not being handled by politicians at all, and that courts should be a part 
of, and ultimately defer to, this special political process. These two conditions can be 
met by having a legislative process of rights review that is supplemented by ‘weak’ 
review through the courts.
For example, the UK Human Rights Act (HRA) combines both these elements. 
Rather than an entrenched Charter above the normal political process, the HRA 
is an ordinary statute that incorporates the ECHR into domestic law but which 
can be repealed or amended like any other piece of legislation. The Act established 
particularly rigorous procedures for ensuring all other legislation takes rights into 
consideration.30 Under section 19 of the HRA, Ministers must accompany all leg-
islative proposals with a declaration of compatibility with the Act, or if necessary 
explain why they believe it is justified in not being compatible. These declarations 
are informed by a scrutiny of the legislation by a special committee of both Houses 
of Parliament, the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR). The JCHR reports 
inform subsequent debate on the legislation in Parliament and Explanatory Notes on 
rights compliance are now published with every government bill. Other jurisdictions 
28  Dahl, ‘Decision-making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as National Policymaker’, 6 J Public L 
(1957) 279.
29  Waldron, ‘Can There Be a Democratic Jurisprudence?’, 58 Emory LJ (2008–2009) 675.
30 Bellamy,  supra note 4.
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which prioritize parliamentary over judicial scrutiny of rights, such as the Nordic 
and many former Commonwealth countries, typically adopt similarly rigorous polit-
ical procedures.31 At the same time, section 3 of the HRA allows weak review by 
the courts,32 whereby they can declare a measure or law incompatible with a bill of 
rights, at least so far as it applies to a given case, with the final decision on whether 
to repeal or amend the legislation remaining the prerogative of the democratically 
elected legislature.
The rationale for weak review follows from the two elements underlying the politi-
cal constitutionalist case itself: the possibility for reasonable disagreement about rights 
and the fallibility of any decision about them, and the need for the equal consideration 
of the views and interests of citizens. Weak review provides for contestatory ‘editorial’ 
democracy rather than ‘authorial’ democracy.33 It invites legislatures to think again. 
That can be justified if a legal challenge reveals inconsistencies between legislative 
acts, unearths unfortunate consequences not anticipated when framing the legisla-
tion, or when certain minorities prove so ‘discreet and isolated’ that their concerns fail 
to gain a hearing through democratic politics.
The capacity of courts to uncover such problems derives from their focus on indi-
vidual cases. As a result, they can draw attention to those circumstances when legisla-
tion and policies might produce adverse effects for certain categories of persons that 
legislatures, which cannot explore or anticipate every possibility and are chiefly con-
cerned with general rather than particular considerations, may have overlooked or 
underestimated. However, political constitutionalists contend that this same feature 
of courts makes them poorly suited for considering rights in the round and the ways 
the gains for rights protection overall might need to be balanced against such individ-
ual cases. Government action may sometimes curb given rights of certain groups to 
promote the more equal or fuller enjoyment of the full range of rights by other groups. 
For example, governments may wish to regulate tobacco advertising, thereby limiting 
freedom of speech, for reasons of public health, or to constrain freedom of contract 
and exchange to protect minimum employment standards or to secure certain pub-
lic goods. The legal and individual focus may unduly narrow the range of moral and 
other considerations that need to be taken into account, and over-emphasize the dan-
ger of government power to rights.34 Courts may be jurisdictionally constrained from 
considering, and in any case have less access to, the multifarious concerns of millions 
of individuals that legislatures need to respond to. Consequently, it remains important 
for the democratic legitimacy of such judicial opinions that the final word lies with the 
31  See T. Campbell et al., The Legal Protection of Rights: Sceptical Essays (2011), Pt 2 for a discussion of 
different parliamentary systems for rights protection and Hiebert, ‘Interpreting a Bill of Rights: The 
Importance of Legislative Rights Review’, 35 British J Political Science (2005) 235 on the Commonwealth 
model.
32  Tushnet, ‘Alternative forms of Judicial Review’, 101 Michigan L Rev (2003) 2781, at 2782–2786.
33  These terms are taken from Pettit, ‘Democracy: Electoral and Contestatory’, in I. Shapiro and S. Macedo 
(eds), Designing Democratic Institutions (2000), at 105.
34  M. Tushnet, Weak Courts, Strong Rights: Judicial Review and Social Welfare Rights in Comparative Constitutional 
Law (2007).
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legislature. The purpose of such review is to enhance the democratic consideration of 
rights, not to substitute for it.
While the HRA’s provisions for legislative scrutiny of rights and weak review pro-
vide a model of how the judicial and democratic protection of rights might be com-
bined in ways consistent with political constitutionalism, two features of the Act have 
come in for increasing criticism. These are the obligation of the British courts to take 
into account the jurisprudence of the EHCtR (section 2(1)) and the fast tracking to the 
ECtHR of those cases that give rise to a declaration of incompatibility in the domestic 
courts and find no legislative redress (section10). I now turn to the issue of whether 
political constitutionalists must regard IHRCs and IHRCts as falling foul of the four 
objections.
3  A Global Political Constitution?
The foregoing analysis showed how political constitutionalists believe that the deter-
mination of any collective policy on rights must be under the equal control of those to 
whom they are to apply, at least indirectly via their elected representatives. Courts may 
play a part in ensuring that all interests have been equally considered, but the final 
say must rest with the democratic legislature and ultimately the people themselves. 
To be compatible with political constitutionalism, therefore, IHRCs and IHRCts must 
be: (1) products of and controlled by an international system of normal democracy 
grounded in and attuned to the domestic systems of the contracting states; (2) offer 
international versions of a legislative bill of rights; and (3) only involve the exercise of 
`weak’ review.
Consequently, the fourth, ‘judicial discretion’, objection to IHRCts can only be met 
by overcoming the first, ‘exclusive democratic control’, objection. Meeting these two 
objections at the international level would seem to require also meeting the second, 
global democratic deficit, objection, and the third, constitutional transfer, objection, 
by creating a global or, in the European and similar cases, regional demos and a cor-
responding global or regional political and constitutional order, with which all demoi 
merge via a series of referenda.35 Even supposing such a global democratic system 
was both feasible and desirable, its establishment would still pose a significant con-
tingent barrier to the democratic legitimacy of IHRCts for the foreseeable future. Yet 
the feasibility and desirability of such global or regional democratic systems can also 
be doubted, since they are unlikely to possess the constitutional qualities political and 
legal constitutionalists associate with democracy.
The political constitutionalist case rests on the democratic process being able to pro-
mote the collective interests of those involved in a public and equal way. Unless there is 
a shared public sphere and reasonably clear lines of authorization and accountability, 
on the one hand, and a roughly equal stake in the decisions being made and suffi-
cient shared values and cross-cutting cleavages to overcome the problem of persistent 
35  Habermas, ‘The Constitutionalization of International Law and the Legitimation Problems of a 
Constitution for World Society’, 15 Constellations (2008) 444.
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minorities, on the other, neither of these qualities is likely to obtain.36 A global demos 
will in all probability be too culturally and socially differentiated for either of these 
ontological prerequisites for fair democratic decision-making to exist.37 Moreover, 
the homogenization needed to overcome these difficulties would itself involve a loss 
of value in denying those existing peoples, which do possess shared political cultures 
and histories, the capacity to live according to their various different and not always 
compatible norms.
Many legal constitutionalists have similar reservations about such schemes. Some 
legal cosmopolitans have supposed it would be sufficient from a legal constitutional-
ist perspective to meet the third, constitutional transfer, objection and have a con-
stitutional referendum transferring the requisite authority to an IHRCt.38 Yet, as the 
German Federal Constitutional Court’s Maastricht and Lisbon decisions indicate,39 that 
would not satisfy all such legal constitutionalist concerns. In these judgments, the 
Court argued that its legitimacy lay in representing a German demos that is capable of 
expressing itself through an associated national democratic system. As such, the Court 
could only hand over that responsibility to the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) in circumstances where the CJEU was similarly responsible to a European demos. 
Only then would it be appropriate to ask the German people if they were prepared to join 
such an arrangement. Until that time it might be possible for a state to confer certain 
competences on an international body, but the responsibility for ensuring it operated 
legitimately remained with the relevant domestic institutions, not least the German 
Court itself.40 Thus, it would appear that for legal as well as political constitutionalists 
the legitimacy of IHRCts will rest for the foreseeable future on their being placed under 
the demoi-cratic control of the various demoi that acknowledge their authority,41 at 
least indirectly via their democratically authorized and accountable political and legal 
representatives. It remains to be seen how far, if at all, this can be achieved.
4  International Courts and a Demoicratic Association of 
Democratic States
The last two sections indicated that for political and many legal constitutionalists a 
democratically legitimate system of international human rights protection will need 
to be subject to on-going democratic political control through the ordinary legislative 
process. Such control must apply to the content of the IHRC, the running of the legal 
36  Christiano, ‘Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions’, in S. Besson, and J. Tasioulis (eds), 
The Philosophy of International Law (2010), at 119.
37  Miller, ‘Democracy’s Domain’, 37 Phil and Pub Aff (2009) 201.
38  Buchanan and Powell, supra note 2.
39  Brunner v. European Union Treaty, 12 Oct. 1993, BVerfGE 89, 155, [1994]; German Lisbon Decision, 30 
June 2009, BVerfG, 2 be 2/08.
40  Ibid., at para. 301. I appreciate these judgments are controversial, and the Court’s bark proved louder 
than its bite, given that it affirmed the German constitution’s openness to international law. Here it suf-
fices to note that legal constitutionalists could raise this objection. See P. Lindseth, Power and Legitimacy: 
Reconciling Europe and the Nations State (2010), at 24.
41  For the notion of demoicracy see Nicolaïdis, `European Demoicracy and its Crisis’, 51 JCMS (2013) 351.
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system charged with its interpretation, and to the competences and – in the ultimate 
instance – to the decisions of the IHRCt. The challenge, addressed in this section, is to 
see whether that is possible without assuming a regional or global demos and demo-
cratic system that might exercise that control.
The first, exclusive democratic control, objection provides a key barrier in this 
regard. It suggests that the only democratically legitimate international order would 
be a world of separate and independent democratic states. However, this picture of 
autarkic democratic states is unrealistic given the current reality of interdependence, 
a condition on which a great deal of our economic well-being depends. In these cir-
cumstances, decisions in one state can have important consequences for those in 
another state, undermining exclusive democratic control. Creating international 
regimes, such as IHRCs, is one way to respond to this situation. In certain respects, 
they involve a weakening of exclusive democratic control. But in other respects, as 
I shall show, these regimes can be conceived in ways that seek to bolster it and to ren-
der it as compatible with an interconnected world as possible.
Three issues might motivate democratic states to establish IHRCs and IHRCts. All 
three stem from a commitment to upholding the ‘right of rights’ of peoples (and 
hence of their citizens) to live under democratic regimes. First, states may support 
such mechanisms as ways of promoting democratization. The move to judicializa-
tion generally occurs when hegemonic elites fear their political opponents may over-
turn their policies.42 The governments of new democracies can rationally see such 
international commitments as helping to lock in the domestic status quo against their 
non-democratic opponents. Mature democracies may doubt the utility or legitimacy 
of such arrangements for themselves but regard them as helpful for less established 
democracies. Support for this function can be regarded as a corollary of the politi-
cal constitutionalist belief that rights are best protected through democracy and 
because of the threat that non-democratic or unstable democratic regimes may pose 
to democracies.43
Secondly, even if all states are democratic, democratic states have an incentive to 
ensure that their ability to operate in a democratic manner is not undermined by the 
decisions of other states, democratic or otherwise. Therefore, they have reason to cre-
ate institutions to guarantee that democracies treat each other with equal concern and 
respect.44 Examples include trade negotiations, particularly concerning the exploitation 
of another country’s natural resources, and the promotion of global public goods such as 
combating climate change and protecting the environment more generally. These argu-
ments also extend to establishing mechanisms to ensure that trans- and multi-national 
corporations and organizations respect democratic standards and decision-making.
Both the first and second issues can also be related to protecting the stateless and 
those seeking entry to democratic states. On the one hand, such persons lack access 
to the democratic process and, since democratic states are committed to spreading 
42  R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (2004).
43 Moravcsik,  supra note 3, at 243–246.
44  Pettit, ‘Legitimate International Institutions: A Neo-Republican Perspective’, in Besson and Tasioulis, 
supra note 36, at 139, 152–153.
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democracy, the reasoning underlying the first issue also extends to them. On the other 
hand, democratic states might fear that unless the burden of admitting them is shared 
equitably, the democratic quality of certain states could suffer, thereby invoking the 
second issue. As a result, states have an interest in securing common, democracy-
friendly, policies in this area.
Finally, even mature democracies can acknowledge that no democratic process is 
perfect. So long as the imperfections of any judicial process can also be corrected by 
a democratic mechanism, then providing a contestatory channel at the international 
level may allow lessons to be learned from other democracies and certain unfounded 
parochial biases and prejudices to be challenged.
These three issues can be linked to three criteria for the governance of the inter-
national mechanisms that might be established to address them so as to ensure that 
these in their turn remain consistent with political constitutionalist assumptions.45
First, these courts and the international arrangements of which they form a part 
must promote and be compatible with the possibility for all individuals to live in legiti-
mate states that possess democratic systems where collective decisions are made in 
ways that show them equal respect and concern through being under their shared and 
equal control. Secondly, these international mechanisms should be under the equal 
control of such states. If the legitimacy of democratic states stems from them offer-
ing reasonably effective mechanisms for the identification and equal advancement of 
the interests of their citizens, then the legitimacy of international systems stems from 
them doing likewise through being in their turn under the shared and equal control 
of the signatory states. Thirdly, membership of such international systems should be 
voluntary. Not all states will have an equal stake in collective arrangements on a given 
issue, and many will not have equal bargaining power. Voluntary arrangements allow 
states to tailor their international commitments to the interests of their populations 
and ideally to negotiate the terms of their adherence accordingly.
The basic institutional model of the international order stemming from these issues 
and criteria is that of a voluntary and fair association among democratic states. Such 
an association offers a ‘two level’ political constitution,46 whereby a political constitu-
tion at the international level renders an IHRC and IHRCt subject to the democratic 
authorization and accountability of the representatives of the contracting democratic 
states, who are in their turn democratically authorized and accountable to those they 
represent through a political constitution at the domestic level. A number of recom-
mendations follow from this account as to the competences and scope of judicial 
review by IHRCts, on the one hand, and the democratic organization of IHRCs, on the 
other. I shall take each in order below.
With regard to the competences and scope of IHRCts four remarks are in order. 
First, as Thomas Christiano has noted,47 this model grounds certain international jus 
cogens norms concerning the performance of agreements duly made and against slav-
ery, genocide and aggressive war, since these norms are prerequisites of, or internal to, 
45  Ibid., at 153–158; Christiano, supra note 36, at 122–124, 126–129.
46  Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, 42 Int’l Org (1988) 427.
47 Christiano,  supra note 36, at 123.
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such an arrangement and the importance it places on the value of consent. Therefore, 
there can be no problem with IHRCts seeking to uphold such norms unconditionally.
Secondly, a prime focus of such Conventions should be the interactions between 
states and those who either lack democratic representation or operate outside adequate 
democratic control, such as refugees and multinational corporations respectively.
Thirdly, if IHRCts are to respect the integrity of the democratic process, particu-
larly in their judgments on domestic legislation and policies, they must be restricted to 
weak review. Moreover, contestation ought to be limited to cases where domestic polit-
ical and judicial avenues have been exhausted and only involve those rights that might 
be considered basic to each citizen within a given polity being able publicly to advance 
their interests on equal terms to others, though controversy exists as to whether these 
involve only core civil and political rights or also certain minimum social and eco-
nomic rights too.48 Allowance also has to be made for the variety of ways different 
legal systems may choose to specify a given right and the numerous circumstances 
that may lead legislatures to limit the scope of one right in order to secure other rights.
Fourthly, given that courts may be as mistaken as legislators, the possibility for a demo-
cratic override of an IHRCt judgment must also exist, with such decisions resting with a 
consensus among the representatives of the democratic governments, who should be ulti-
mately charged with monitoring state compliance with the Court’s rulings. A number of 
benefits stem from this arrangement. For a start, from the perspective of the democratic 
state challenging the judgment, this would be a decision of peers.49 The governments of 
other democratic states would appreciate the need to attune rights to domestic situations 
and the adverse reaction an IHRCt decision perceived as insensitive to such consider-
ations and in error might arouse. Yet, that need not mean they would tolerate almost any 
objection to a ruling that proved inconvenient for the government concerned – quite the 
contrary. For they would also be fully alive to the dangers of allowing states to renege on 
their solidaristic obligations and of undermining the Court’s authority through frivolous 
or self-serving challenges – particularly with regard to democratizing states.
The issue of democratic organization enters here, with three points being pertinent. 
First, this model is compatible with granting IHRCts a degree of independence from 
the states that bring them into being so long as the participating states have the right 
of exit and can determine the competences of these Courts. In other words, the func-
tionaries of the IHRC, such as the judges, may act independently but the system itself 
must be democratically dependent on the contracting states.
Secondly, the democratic legitimacy of such dependence rests on the agents of the 
states involved adequately reflecting the views and concerns of the populations they 
represent. Consequently, signatories to IHRCs should be limited to states that are at 
least credibly democratizing. The evidence suggests that non-democratic states do 
not respect the decisions of such bodies in any case – their formal adherence merely 
serves to give a spurious legitimacy to such regimes.50 Meanwhile, given the discretion 
48 Christiano,  supra note 21, at 273–274.
49  Scharpf, ‘Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity’, 1 European Political Science Rev (2009) 173, at 
199–200.
50  B. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights (2009).
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executives of even democratic states have been accustomed to enjoy in foreign affairs, 
it is important to ensure the state officials involved remain accountable for their deci-
sions to the legislature and ultimately the electorate.
Finally, if the system as a whole is to offer equal consideration to the interests of 
the democratic peoples that it serves, then the signatory states ought to exercise equal 
control over the IHRC. For example, all states should have an equal vote in decisions 
regarding changes to the Convention, the selection of judges and instructions as to their 
working methods, the implementation of the Court’s judgments, the budget, and so on.
How do these arrangements fare against the four objections? With regard to the 
first, exclusive democratic control, objection, that is met at a base line level by insisting 
that entry into these arrangements is voluntary and includes a right of exit. Moreover, 
their purpose and operation are structured around respect for democratic self-govern-
ment. As we saw, this goal lies behind both the three issues motivating the establish-
ment of this system and the three criteria guiding its competences and organization. 
In particular, its governance structure does not involve a simple transfer of author-
ity from a domestic to an international actor. Rather, it places domestic actors, who 
remain democratically accountable to citizens or their representatives, in control on 
an equal and democratic basis. This structure overcomes the second, global demo-
cratic deficit, objection without assuming either a global demos or democracy. Instead, 
the arrangement is one of a democratic international association of democracies and 
their demoi. This sort of ‘two level’ arrangement has been characterized as demoicratic. 
The fact that the system is an outgrowth of domestic democratic systems reduces the 
force of the third objection regarding the need for a constitutional transition. There is 
not so much a transfer of competences as the creation of a jointly controlled mech-
anism to tackle those common problems that domestic institutions lack the compe-
tence to deal with alone. Finally, the fourth objection, of undue judicial discretion, is 
met through rendering the IHRCt systemically dependent on the collective democratic 
decisions of the contracting states with regard to their competences and, in the last 
instance, judgments. Judges may be independent but only with respect to weak review.
Clearly, many problems stand in the way of realizing this system, and in practice insti-
tutional arrangements may not necessarily always meet the criteria or answer all relevant 
issues. In particular, there is the problem of asymmetric bargaining between richer and 
more powerful states and poorer and weaker states, though coalitions among the latter can 
to some degree counteract the influence of the former.51 As with all domestic democratic 
systems, the international demoicratic system is work in progress, with various groups 
employing the existing processes to further, and occasionally to hinder, its development. 
This section has aimed simply at formulating its normative and institutional underpinnings.
5  The Political Constitution of the ECHR
A measure of the plausibility of this approach can be gauged by the significant degree 
to which the ECHR can be assimilated to it. All signatories must meet certain minimal 
51 Christiano,  supra note 36, at 125–126; Pettit, supra note 44, at 158–160.
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democratic standards. The Court and Convention are overseen by the Council of 
Europe, the governance structure of which consists of the Committee of Ministers, 
comprising the Foreign Ministers or their permanent representatives of all 47 mem-
ber states, along with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). 
The Committee decides the Council’s budget, negotiates the treaties and conventions 
governing its competences, and monitors the implementation of Court decisions. 
PACE, which includes between two and 18 members, depending on population size, 
from the national parliaments of each of the signatory states, selects the judges – one 
from each member state – and the Secretary General of the Council from lists supplied 
by the Committee of Ministers. As a result, there is a degree of legislative oversight 
of executive action in this area, with PACE also receiving regular reports from and 
making recommendations to the Committee of Ministers. The danger of overlooking 
domestic or transnational minorities is also lessened through the involvement of a 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, composed of 
elected members from these bodies within the member states charged with exploring 
the enhancement of local democracy and, in an advisory role, the International Non-
governmental Organizations (INGOs) Conference of the Council of Europe.
Meanwhile, the Court applies a margin of appreciation in making its judgments, 
especially where no common standard exists across the Council of Europe and it may 
be necessary to balance rights and other interests,52 thereby taking account of the 
diverse ways a right may be specified within different legal systems. Moreover, the 
Court has generally applied a wider margin when the case involves a choice that has 
been publically debated by a democratic legislature and where opinions reasonably 
differ, and narrowed it where a legislature has enacted or re-enacted a measure with-
out due consideration.53 Its judgments also only apply to the given jurisdiction and 
do not necessarily serve as precedents for rulings in similar cases in another state, 
thereby minimizing the ‘one size fits all’ problem. The recent Brighton declaration has 
proposed formally incorporating both the margin of appreciation and the principle of 
subsidiarity into the Preamble to the Convention,54 thereby underlining that the pri-
mary duty for the implementation of Convention rights rests with domestic legal and 
especially political organs. Indeed, it proposes that all parliaments should adopt the 
enhanced pre-legislative scrutiny procedures currently found in the UK and Nordic 
countries. In fact, the record suggests that the ECtHR already operates at the margins 
so far as mature democracies are concerned. For example, since 1966 97 per cent of 
the cases brought against the UK have been deemed inadmissible, while only 271 out 
of the 443 cases that were heard were held to involve an infraction – 61 per cent or an 
average of 6.15 cases per year, less than 2 per cent of all cases brought. Five countries 
52 See  Rasmussen v. Denmark (1984) 7 EHRR 371, at paras 40–41 for the lack of a common approach, and 
Dickenson v. United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 41, GC, at paras 77–79 for the issue of balance.
53  Hatton v. United Kingdom (2003) 37 EHRR 28, GC, at para. 97; Draon v. France (2006) 42 EHRR 40, GC, 
at paras 106–108, and – for the converse argument – Hirst v. United Kingdom (No. 2) (2006) 42 EHRR 
41; Sukhovetsky v. Ukraine (2007) 44 EHRR 57, at paras 65–67, and the analysis in A. Legg, The Margin 
of Appreciation in International Human Rights Law (2012), especially ch. 4.
54  High Level Conference on the future of the ECtHR, Brighton Declaration, 19/20 Apr. 2012, available at: 
http://hub.coe.int/en/20120419-brighton-declaration/.
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– Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Turkey, and Italy – currently account for over half the 
cases brought before the Court, with Russia alone responsible for 27 per cent of them.
These features of the Council of Europe correspond quite closely to the criteria 
and corresponding recommendations given in the last section for ensuring that an 
international association of democracies itself meets democratic criteria. Not only is 
it under the equal control of the representatives of democratic states, but these repre-
sentatives are not simply from the executive branch. The involvement of parliament-
ary representatives and, to a lesser extent, representatives from local government and 
NGOs as well, increases the likelihood that state policies are more democratically rep-
resentative of domestic interests than is often the case in foreign affairs, including 
minority interests. As a result, it meets the concerns behind the ‘global democratic 
deficit’ objection in ways that address at least some of the worries behind the ‘exclu-
sive democratic control’ objection. The ECHR can be regarded in some ways as having 
the qualities of an international legislative charter of rights, with reports from PACE 
often leading to changes to the convention or procedures by the Council of Ministers. 
Last but not least, the ECtHR is politically dependent, in being chosen and overseen by 
a representative body of the contracting states, and is constrained to respect to a high 
degree their domestic rights enforcing mechanisms. As a result of these two aspects, 
the force of the judicial discretion objection is also weakened to a considerable extent.
That said, the ECHR system falls down in two key respects. First, notwithstanding 
the margin of appreciation, strictly speaking the ECtHR does not adopt weak review. 
Under Article 46 of the Convention its judgments have binding force on the High 
Contracting Parties, and once a final ruling has been given by a Grand Chamber there 
are no further grounds of appeal. Still, it does not disapply national laws – they remain 
in force until the relevant domestic legislature changes them and can only offer a rem-
edy in international not domestic law. To that extent, the ECtHR could be described as 
applying a ‘soft’ version of strong review. Yet, the system could be adapted to deliver 
weak review relatively easily. As I noted, the Committee of Ministers is responsible for 
the implementation of these judgments and can sanction a member for failing to com-
ply and even expel it. However, it would be perfectly possible to allow the Committee to 
become the final court of appeal as proposed above.
Secondly, hitherto the focus of the ECtHR has been on the issue of domestic compli-
ance with the ECHR. Although the Council of Europe has explored common issues 
affecting the relations between states, these have been at the margins. That will 
change with the proposed accession of the EU to the ECHR, which will introduce 
monitoring of inter-state economic agreements for compliance with human rights. 
Already, an important difference between the ECtHR and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) with regard to labour rights suggests ways in which this move 
might lead to greater equal respect and concern between the states involved for their 
internal democratic processes.55 Yet, how far that happens is likely to depend on the 
degree to which both the Council of Europe and the EU are regarded as being bound 
by a political rather than a legal constitution.
55  Fudge, ‘Constitutionalizing Labour Rights in Europe’, in Campbell et al., supra note 31, at 244.
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6  The Disadvantages of Legal Cosmopolitanism and the 
Advantages of the Political Constitutional Approach
So far I have simply argued that it is possible to provide a political constitutionalist 
account of IHRCs that meets the four objections. I have said relatively little about the 
broader advantages that might derive from a political constitutionalist rather than 
a cosmopolitan legal constitutionalist perspective that rejected the four objections in 
the first place. Such a cosmopolitan position can take a number of forms. Here I shall 
consider a relatively modest version, which avoids controversial ontological and epis-
temological claims as far as possible. This version might grant that some reasonable 
disagreement about rights exists, but note that in practice most democracies agree on 
the broad outlines of at least some basic rights, such as those in the ECHR, and that for 
pragmatic as much as principled reasons rights-based judicial review of domestic leg-
islation by independent international courts offers a way of correcting for local preju-
dices, self-interest, or myopia.56 These pragmatic arguments can be roughly grouped 
together under the legal norm of ‘nemo iudex in sua causa’.57 In this section I shall 
argue that many of these concerns prove misplaced and that weak review within a 
political constitutionalist structure offers a more effective and coherent approach to 
rights promotion than strong review by an IHRCt cut off from democratic control.
For a start, it can be questioned how far it is applicable to regard a democratic state 
as being a ‘judge in its own cause’. This position treats a state as a unitary actor, decid-
ing an issue of rights in its own self-interest. However, given that the decisions in ques-
tion tend not to be about inter-state relations, it seems inappropriate to regard these 
judgments as challenging the self-interest of states. The exceptions might be policies 
concerning access to citizenship or entry to and continued residence in a state for 
asylum seekers or immigrants. These cases are additionally strong given that neither 
group can influence the relevant domestic legal and political system via the demo-
cratic process, while most of the first and many of the second will either be citizens of 
regimes that are not democratic, or only minimally so, or stateless persons. However, 
we saw in section 3 that democratic states have incentives to create collective arrange-
ments to deal with such issues that can balance the rights of their citizens against 
those of aspirant and non-citizens, and ultimately aim to promote democracy among 
all states. As a result, such arrangements only require weak review. Given that it is 
mutually advantageous for all the contracting states to a convention to comply with 
them, this would not be an issue where governments would be likely to regard an 
ICtHR as exceeding its competence.
It is also worth noting that what is perhaps the strongest case for strong review 
is also the least developed in practice. In the standard cases, which concern purely 
domestic measures that only affect citizens, the notion of the state being ‘judge in its 
own cause’ proves harder to sustain.58 The democratic decision-making process that 
56 Buchanan,  supra note 15, at 297–298.
57  Buchanan and Powell, supra note 2, at 330–336.
58  Hessler, ‘Resolving Interpretive Conflicts in International Human Rights Law’, 13.1 J Political Philosophy 
(2005) 29, at 41–42.
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leads to the disputed law involves a large number of different and often opposed actors. 
Elected executives will have had to gain the assent of representatives in Parliament 
and indirectly a majority of citizens, while domestic courts will have also held the 
measure to be acceptable. Moreover, as we have seen, these domestic processes may 
well have been scrupulous in their attention to rights considerations. There will have 
been no single actor ‘judging in its own cause’ in this situation. Within most demo-
cratic systems, an electoral majority is built on a coalition of diverse groups of voters, 
with the executive and legislative majority often made up of a shifting coalition of dif-
ferent parties. In many systems, measures have to be approved by two chambers and 
are subject to review by domestic courts.
It will be objected that nonetheless certain ‘discrete and insular’ or widely dispersed 
minorities, with little or no bargaining power, might still be consistently ignored by 
these democratic and legal mechanisms. Those social groups who are likely to form 
part of the electoral majority and the domestic legal and political elite may suppress 
these minorities’ individual rights – be it through self-interest, prejudice, myopia, 
ignorance, carelessness, or plain error. Indeed, one or more of these factors could lead 
a majority to pay insufficient attention to their own rights in the face of an over zeal-
ous, inept, misguided, or corrupt executive, as some commentators have alleged has 
been the case with excessively restrictive anti-terrorist legislation. In such instances, 
an IHRCt offers even a well-run domestic legal and political system the benefit of an 
‘outsider’s’ perspective. For example, other legal systems may provide instances of 
policies that challenge the local prejudices and assumptions of the state in question. 
Through being more disengaged from the circumstances that give rise to a given pol-
icy, such bodies can also help guard against precipitate over-reactions to a shocking 
incident, such as a terrorist bomb or the abduction of a child, and point to the longer 
term adverse consequences of over-hasty legislation.
Though such reasoning may prove valid in certain circumstances, it is again doubt-
ful that it offers a general case for anything beyond ‘weak review’. Indeed, the draw-
backs political constitutionalists note with relying on courts for the defence of rights 
may be amplified in the case of judicial review by IHRCts, in part for the very reasons 
that their proponents advance in their defence. For a start, the ‘outsider’s’ view may 
overlook how the specification of a particular right within a given legal system forms 
part of a more general approach to rights, that balances different rights consider-
ations and which, taken overall, is reasonable and reflects local circumstances and 
concerns.59 Ruling on a single case does not allow for all these various factors to be 
taken into account, and IHRCts are likely to be even less aware of the impact on other 
rights and moral concerns of citizens than a domestic court. An IHRCt may also be 
moved to assume ‘one size fits all’ and seek to apply a minimal standard that overlooks 
substantive differences between different cases and systems.
Distance also exacerbates the potential for the under-protection of rights that 
can arise when IHRCts are perceived as the key agents of rights protection. Whereas 
political constitutionalism stresses ex ante rights scrutiny, courts operate ex post. 
59  Ibid., at 43–44.
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If a higher court comes to be regarded as the prime instrument of rights protec-
tion, there is a danger that the subordinate bodies – particularly executives and 
legislatures – will be less scrupulous themselves and take rights into consideration 
only to the extent that they believe they may be legally challenged to do so. An 
IHRCt may exacerbate this tendency by adding to the already high costs in time 
and money of mounting a legal challenge. Meanwhile, though IHRCts can help 
dilute the influence of local factions, weakening the effects of their rent seeking 
and prejudices, they may also give undue weight in their turn to those groups able 
to organize transnationally. As we noted, states can unjustifiably exclude under-
privileged groups, such as refugees or poor migrants. However, certain exclusion-
ary state policies – such as those regulating wages or health and safety – may serve 
to provide social protection for the more vulnerable within their borders. Yet, those 
seeking to dismantle exclusions of the latter kind, such as corporations, are likely 
to have more resources and be better able to mount legal challenges at the inter-
national level than those seeking to remove exclusions of the former kind, such as 
the global poor.60
There has been a move recently to enshrine some of these social protections in 
IHRCs. However, many of these issues are matters of reasonable disagreement within 
most democracies and closely related to the left-right divide that forms the dominant 
political cleavage within them. As we noted, courts also have limitations when decid-
ing general issues of public policy and often feel they lack the expertise as well as the 
legitimacy to do so. All rights are costly and how far any state may be able to meet its 
rights commitments will be a matter of degree, involving various trade-offs that courts 
invariably feel reluctant to make. Again, distance can add to the court’s timidity in 
areas that may entail more rather than less state action. Unsurprisingly, the empirical 
record suggests the constitutionalization of social rights has little impact per se. The 
key factors are the degree of development of the country concerned and the ability 
of the underprivileged to organize themselves through unions and parties capable of 
promoting their interests.61
It might be thought that when courts fail to correct an injustice their influence is 
neutral – they have simply failed to right a wrong. That is not the case. Under strong 
review they add legitimacy to that wrong and render its righting harder. Courts may 
also make mistakes, and in doing so commit a double wrong. Not only have the rights 
of those individuals directly affected by the particular decision been infringed, but so 
has the right of all citizens to have an equal say in defining their rights. Weak review 
may commit the first wrong but in escaping the second also makes the rectification of 
the first easier to effect.
Given that the legitimacy of democratic processes to decide rights issues depends 
on their providing an adequate means for giving equal consideration to the views and 
interests of those concerned, it has been argued that even if courts ought not to offer 
substantive rulings on the nature of rights they do have a role in deeming whether 
60  Nicol, ‘Business Rights as Human Rights’, in Campbell et al,. supra note 31, at 229.
61  Hirschl and Rosevear, ‘Constitutional Law Meets Comparative Politics: Socio-economic Rights and 
Political Realities’, in Campbell et al. supra note 30, 207
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democratic procedures meet the appropriate standards for their decisions to have 
authority.62 Moreover, the argument for not being judge in one’s own cause appears 
particularly strong in this case. Those in power will always have an incentive to alter 
the rules of the game in their favour. The difficulty is that process issues can be as sub-
ject to reasonable disagreement as substantive questions. Citizens may agree that pro-
cedures should show those involved equal respect and concern, yet disagree as to how 
best to interpret these requirements. These procedural disagreements will most likely 
reflect their substantive disagreements. Even when agreement exists on a given under-
standing of political equality, the institutions most likely to bring it about are difficult 
to specify and likely to depend on the social circumstances in which they are located. 
Therefore, it can be hard for courts to offer an impartial or satisfactory decision in such 
cases, with IHRCts once again hampered by distance and a lack of local knowledge.
Although a human right to democracy is controversial,63 it might be thought central 
for political constitutionalists – even the ‘right of rights’64 – and so render strong judi-
cial review legitimate.65 In this area, courts could be said not just to restore the rights 
of those individuals who have been unjustly excluded from the process but also the 
rights of all those involved in it, because by ensuring their inclusion a court reinstates 
the authority of the process as a whole.66 Yet, the principled and pragmatic objections 
to strong review remain, given that courts may fail to uphold the democratic rights 
of citizens or even hamper attempts by the legislature to do so. For example, compare 
Buckley v. Valeo, where the US Supreme Court prevented the legislature limiting cam-
paign finance, to the British Parliament’s considered preparedness to override poten-
tial judicial objections to its regulation of political advertising in the Communications 
Act 2003. Both cases concerned freedom of speech and the appropriate way to secure 
its promotion. 67 The difference between the Supreme Court’s perspective and that of 
the UK (and US) legislature was not between a rights-based view and a non-rights-
based view, but over which measures best secured this right within a democratic soci-
ety. Again, the argument points at best to weak review because, while it is important 
to draw attention to potential individual rights infringements, a court may not offer 
the most suitable forum for ensuring rights protection remains consistent with equal 
concern and respect for all citizens. In this case, it could be argued it was precisely 
because the politicians had an interest in the decision that they appreciated the need 
for regulation to ensure a roughly level playing field for fair and equal elections.
62  J. H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (1980)
63  Cohen, ‘Is There a Human Right to Democracy?’, in C. Sypnowich (ed.), The Egalitarian Conscience: Essays 
in Honour of G. A. Cohen (2006), at 226.
64 Waldron,  supra note 11, at 232.
65 Dahl,  Democracy and its Critics (1989), at 191 and 359 n. 9.
66 Christiano  supra note 20, at 275–277.
67  The UK Parliament (Communications Act 2003 (UK), 2003, c. 21, ss. 319–321) sought to ensure politi-
cal equality at election time by regulating political broadcasts – a move that had cross-party support but 
which it anticipated, in part because of decisions such as Buckley v. Valeo 424 US (1976), 1, might be 
ruled as contrary to Art. 10 ECHR, leading to a declaration of incompatibility as allowed under Art. 19 
HRA. Influenced by Parliament’s reasoning, the British courts subsequently upheld the measure in R. 
(Animal Defenders International) v. Secretary for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15, especially Lord 
Bingham at paras. 7–21.
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Finally, the argument against being judge in one’s own cause is in some respects 
deployed selectively and ultimately lacks coherence. For it is inescapable that some 
person or institution will be. After all, superior courts generally claim the competence 
to decide their own competences. Political constitutionalists argue that to the extent 
that this is true of domestic democratic legislatures it can at least be justified by the 
countervailing principle that ‘what touches all should be decided by all’. This doctrine 
embodies the important epistemic principle that decisions are best made by those with 
sufficient stake in the matter to decide responsibly. IHRCts by their very nature as out-
siders lack that incentive.
7 Conclusion
The upholding of IHRCs by IHRCts has been criticized for lacking democratic legiti-
macy. Such criticisms have emanated from certain legal constitutionalist regimes, 
such as the United States and Germany, but have been particularly strong in political 
constitutionalist regimes, such as the UK. Indeed, a campaign, enjoying cross-party 
support but championed above all by senior Conservatives within the current govern-
ment, now proposes that Britain withdraw from all such arrangements.68 This article 
has taken these criticisms seriously but has argued that they can be met by regarding 
IHRCs as forming part of a ‘two level’ political constitution resulting from an asso-
ciation of democratic states. In fact, the ECHR, which has borne the brunt of recent 
attacks on IHRCts within the UK, largely conforms to this model. This arrangement 
also renders IHRCts consistent with legal constitutionalism at the domestic level by 
allowing national constitutional courts to legitimize and control their competences 
in the name of their respective demoi. Finally, limiting IHRCts to weak review, as this 
system requires, proves not only a more democratically legitimate but also a more 
effective means of protecting rights than the strong review advocated by a legal cos-
mopolitan approach.
68  See ‘Protecting Human Rights in the UK: The Conservatives’ Proposals for Changing Britain’s Human 
Rights Laws’, 3 October 2014. Available at www.politicshome.com/uk/article/105764/the_conserva-
tives_proposals_for_changing_britains_human_rights_laws.html (last visited 3 December 2014).
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